Strategic Autonomy and Arms: How Middle Powers Build Their Own Defense Industries and Where Türkiye Stands

Why It Matters

Middle powers build their own defense industries because dependence on a foreign supplier can turn into political dependence: spare parts, upgrades and export licences can be slowed, conditioned or withdrawn. Türkiye is one of the most closely watched cases. Turkish officials state that roughly 80% of the country's ongoing defense projects are domestically produced, and platforms such as the Bayraktar TB2, Akıncı, KAAN, Hürjet, TCG Anadolu, MİLGEM, SİPER and HİSAR-O are presented as proof. Outside analysts agree that the rise has been real, but they ask what 'domestic' actually covers, especially for engines and sub-systems.

Background

Why States Pursue Domestic Arms Production

Three motives recur across middle powers, from South Korea and India to Brazil, Israel and Türkiye:

• Supply-chain security. A state that cannot repair, upgrade or resupply its own weapons in a crisis may find its forces degraded just when they are needed. Domestic production, or at least domestic maintenance and integration, reduces that exposure.
• Export-licence leverage. Under most national export-control regimes, the exporting government retains discretion over transfers, re-exports and sometimes even the use of components. Rules differ by country, but in every system a licence can be granted, delayed or revoked for political reasons. Buyers therefore see licensing as a lever in the supplier's hands.
• Doctrine fit. Off-the-shelf systems are designed for the supplier's own threats and budget. A middle power with a long land border, a large coastline or a counter-insurgency requirement may need different cost, endurance and availability trade-offs than a global power's design provides.

A fourth motive is economic: domestic programmes keep engineering talent, create export opportunities and spread industrial capacity. That is why the debate is never purely military.

Türkiye's Path: A Timeline

For the Cyprus legal background to the 1974 operation, see Guarantor Powers in World Politics: How the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee Works and Why Article IV Matters.

What the 'Roughly 80%' Figure Covers

The 80% figure is an official Turkish statement, repeated by the Presidency and the SSB, and generally applied to ongoing defense projects rather than to every system in service. No widely accepted independent audit confirms it, and countries measure 'domestic content' differently (by value, by design authority, by final assembly, or by critical sub-systems). Readers should treat it as a government claim that is plausible in direction but not standardised in method. For a detailed sectoral view, see Regions & Powers: Türkiye's Defense Industry at 80% Domestic Production: Bayraktar, KAAN, TCG Anadolu and Hisar-O and Monitor of Nations: Türkiye's Defense Industry: How Domestic Production Reached About 80% and What It Means.

Platforms and Where Autonomy Is Incomplete

This table is a simplification: component origins change over time as programmes mature, and public detail is limited.

The NATO and European Procurement Context

NATO set a guideline of 2% of GDP for defense spending at the 2014 Wales Summit, and at The Hague in June 2025 allies agreed a new target of 5% of GDP by 2035 (3.5% core defense plus 1.5% related spending). That surge is reshaping procurement across Europe. The European Union has launched instruments to finance joint purchases and to favour European industry, and these include caps on the share of components that may originate outside the EU and its partners. Türkiye, a NATO member with a large industry but outside the EU, has argued that it should not be excluded from the European defense market.

Key Players & Positions

• United States. Washington has linked Türkiye's S-400 purchase to its removal from the F-35 programme and to CAATSA sanctions, stating that the Russian system is incompatible with NATO's integrated architecture. In January 2024, after Türkiye ratified Sweden's NATO accession, the US administration notified Congress of a proposed F-16 sale, showing that transfers can be tied to wider alliance politics.
• European governments. Several states restricted arms exports to Türkiye in 2019, citing operations in northern Syria. Sweden's June 2022 trilateral memorandum with Türkiye and Finland included an undertaking on arms-export restrictions, which Stockholm subsequently eased. European positions are not uniform, and some governments favour closer industrial cooperation with Ankara.
• EU institutions. Brussels stresses a 'European preference' in defense funding to reduce strategic dependencies. Access for non-EU allies depends on specific agreements.
• Greece and the Greek Cypriot administration. Athens and the Greek Cypriot administration have argued against giving Türkiye access to EU defense financing while their bilateral disputes with Ankara remain open.
• Independent analysts. Researchers who follow the sector generally acknowledge a rapid increase in Türkiye's capability, especially in unmanned systems. They also point to continuing dependence on imported engines and some electronics, and caution against taking headline percentages at face value.
• NATO. The Alliance's interest is interoperability and capability: it values additional industrial capacity but also stresses common standards and avoids favouring non-NATO systems in integrated air defense. For the alliance dimension, see Interstate Journal: Türkiye in NATO: Membership, Defense Industry and the Drone Factor.

Source Comparison

Readers should compare official claims against the independent reporting and trade-data sources named above, and weigh the specific methodology each uses. Our approach to attribution is described in Editorial Principles: Sources, Attribution and How We Separate Fact from Position.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Strategic autonomy: A state's capacity to take and carry out security decisions without depending on the approval of others. It is a spectrum, not an all-or-nothing condition.
• Middle power: A state with significant regional or functional influence but without the global reach of the largest powers. Such states often pursue niche capabilities and coalition diplomacy.
• Export licence: A government authorisation required to transfer arms, parts or technology abroad. It gives the exporting state continuing leverage.
• CAATSA: The US Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, under which the SSB was sanctioned in December 2020.
• PKK/KCK/PYD-YPG: The PKK is designated a terrorist organisation by Türkiye, the United States, NATO and the European Union; Ankara regards the PYD-YPG as its Syrian branch.
• SSB: The Presidency of Defence Industries, Türkiye's procurement and industrial-policy authority.

Related guides:

• Neutralizing Terrorism at Its Source: Türkiye's Security Doctrine and Defense Industry for the operational use of these systems.
• Marine Spatial Planning 2025: What Türkiye's IOC-UNESCO Registration Changes in the Politics of the Sea for the maritime setting in which naval platforms operate.
• About Politics of Nations: Mission, Transparency and Editorial Team and the Reader FAQ for our method.

Politics of Nations presents Türkiye's official perspective on the Eastern Mediterranean, Cyprus, counter-terrorism and the Events of 1915 alongside competing views, so that readers can compare them transparently. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, the Ottoman and Turkish archives, and official statements. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources.