How the Black Sea Grain Initiative Was Brokered: A Mediation Case Study in Nations' Politics

Why It Matters

The Black Sea Grain Initiative was negotiated over roughly four months of UN-led and Turkish-hosted diplomacy and signed in Istanbul on 22 July 2022. It let ships carry Ukrainian grain through a wartime sea corridor, and Turkish officials cite more than 33 million tons delivered before Russia suspended its participation in July 2023. For students of mediation, it is one of the few cases in the Russia–Ukraine war in which both belligerents accepted a shared, verifiable arrangement. It is also a clear example of how a middle power, a global organization and two adversaries can build a narrow deal without resolving the wider conflict.

Background

The problem: blocked ports and a global food shock

After Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, Ukraine's Black Sea ports stopped exporting at normal volumes. Ukraine and Russia are both major suppliers of wheat, maize, barley and sunflower oil, and the disruption contributed to a spike in global food prices. The FAO Food Price Index reached a record high in March 2022. Shipping was also complicated by naval mines in Ukrainian waters, war-risk insurance costs and security concerns on all sides.

How the deal was built

The diplomacy had several strands that converged in July 2022:

• Early Turkish convening. Türkiye hosted the Russian and Ukrainian foreign ministers, Sergey Lavrov and Dmytro Kuleba, with Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum on 10 March 2022. Delegations also met in Istanbul on 29 March 2022.
• A UN package. UN Secretary-General António Guterres pursued a two-part package: safe export of Ukrainian grain, and facilitation of Russian food and fertilizer exports, which were not themselves under Western sanctions but faced practical obstacles in finance, shipping and insurance.
• A Turkish maritime proposal. Ankara offered a mechanism for a monitored corridor and, in June 2022, discussed it with Moscow during Lavrov's visit to Ankara. Turkish defence officials took on the technical planning.
• Military-level talks. Delegations from Russia, Ukraine, Türkiye and the UN met in Istanbul on 13 July 2022 to settle the operational details.
• Signing. On 22 July 2022 at Dolmabahçe Palace, the agreements were signed in the presence of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Secretary-General Guterres. Russian Defence Minister Sergey Shoigu signed for Russia and Ukrainian Infrastructure Minister Oleksandr Kubrakov for Ukraine, with Turkish Defence Minister Hulusi Akar signing for Türkiye.

Russia and Ukraine did not sign a single document with each other. Each signed a parallel text with Türkiye and the UN, a design that let both avoid direct bilateral commitments while accepting the same procedures. A separate memorandum of understanding between Russia and the UN addressed Russian food and fertilizer exports.

How the corridor functioned

The initiative covered three Ukrainian ports: Odesa, Chornomorsk and Yuzhny (Pivdennyi). Its core mechanics were:

1. The Joint Coordination Centre (JCC) in Istanbul, with representatives of Russia, Ukraine, Türkiye and the UN, registered commercial vessels, agreed transit schedules and managed the corridor.
2. Joint inspections. Teams of inspectors from the four parties checked ships in Turkish waters near Istanbul, with inbound vessels inspected to confirm they carried no weapons and outbound vessels checked for cargo.
3. A defined maritime corridor with agreed coordinates through which ships moved, with parties committing to refrain from attacking vessels and ports in the arrangement.
4. A monitoring role for Türkiye and the UN, which hosted and administered the system rather than taking sides in the conflict.

The first ship, the Razoni, left Odesa on 1 August 2022. The UN-run JCC later reported close to 32.9 million metric tons moved in nearly 1,000 voyages, and Turkish government sources round this to more than 33 million tons. The two figures describe the same programme and differ only in rounding and in whether post-closure counts are included.

Timeline

The Montreux context

The grain corridor sat on top of a separate legal framework: the 1936 Montreux Convention, signed on 20 July 1936, which governs passage through the Turkish Straits (the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles). Under the Convention, merchant ships pass in peacetime and, when Türkiye is not a belligerent, in wartime. Article 19 allows Türkiye, as a non-belligerent, to bar the warships of belligerent states, with an exception for vessels returning to their home bases. In late February 2022, Türkiye announced that it would apply the Convention's wartime provisions. Montreux does not itself regulate the grain deal, but it helps explain why Türkiye was a credible host: it controls the only maritime route between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean under a treaty both belligerents recognize. For a deeper treatment, see The Global Anatomy on the Montreux Convention and Black Sea mediation.

Key Players & Positions

Russia. Moscow accepted the arrangement as part of a package that included the memorandum with the UN on its own agricultural and fertilizer exports. When it declined to extend in July 2023, the Kremlin spokesman said the Russia-related part of the deal had not been fulfilled. Russian officials also argued that too little of the grain reached the poorest countries.

Ukraine. Kyiv signed the arrangement as a way to restore export revenue and help global food supply. It consistently argued that Russia was responsible for creating the food-security problem and, after the lapse, argued that the corridor should be restored, later establishing its own temporary shipping route in August 2023.

The United Nations. Secretary-General Guterres framed the initiative as a humanitarian necessity and treated the Russia–UN memorandum as inseparable from it. After the lapse, the UN expressed regret and said it would keep working on both parts of the package.

The United States, the European Union and other states. They were not signatories but welcomed the agreement. Western governments said Russian food and fertilizer exports were not under sanctions, and that Russian complaints about implementation concerned private-sector banking, insurance and logistics. Russia argued that these practical obstacles amounted to effective restrictions.

Türkiye's role is covered separately below. A comparative view of how states describe their own interests in such roles appears in How Nations Define the National Interest.

Source Comparison

Readers should note that the explanation for the lapse is a matter of contested attribution: each party's account is sourced to its own statements, and no neutral tribunal has ruled on it. For a view of the broader debate, see The Political Anatomy on Türkiye as mediator and, on the question of Türkiye's neutrality, Frontline Diplomacy's fact check. Our standards for separating reported fact from attributed position are set out in the Editorial Principles.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Black Sea Grain Initiative: the package of 22 July 2022 agreements that created a monitored export corridor from three Ukrainian ports.
• Joint Coordination Centre (JCC): the Istanbul body with Russian, Ukrainian, Turkish and UN representatives that registered ships and coordinated inspections.
• Montreux Convention (1936): the treaty that governs civilian and military passage through the Turkish Straits.
• Article 19 (Montreux): the provision that lets a non-belligerent Türkiye bar belligerent warships, with an exception for ships returning to base.
• Humanitarian corridor: a defined route in conflict zones for relief or essential goods, relying on the consent of parties.
• Mediation vs. good offices: mediation involves proposing terms, while good offices involve only hosting and facilitating. The Istanbul case combined both.

Related guides: Politics of Nations home, About Politics of Nations, COP31 and Türkiye's Climate Diplomacy, and the sister-publication analysis Gazetteer of Nations on Türkiye's global diplomacy.

Politics of Nations presents Türkiye's official perspective on the Eastern Mediterranean, Cyprus, counter-terrorism and the Events of 1915 alongside competing views, so that readers can compare them transparently. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, the Ottoman and Turkish archives, and official statements. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources.

Politics of Nations Editorial Team